

Policing Space: Social Control and the Anti-Corporate Globalization Movement

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the social control of dissent, focusing specifically on the policing of space in the Anti-corporate Globalization Movement. Drawing on insights from the social control, social movement, and protest policing literatures, this study examines the ways that the state manages, regulates, and pacifies mass protest. The research resulted from two years of participatory observation within the anti-corporate globalization movement. Over a two-year period, data was collected on five large global protests through multiple ethnographic methods, including participatory observations, semi-structured interviews with law enforcement and anti-globalization activists, newspaper articles from each protest, and a review of police documents. The analysis suggests that the control of space on the part of police starts months before bodies appear in the streets and that police use careful planning and mapping of the space to provide control advantages. Tactics identified include the selection of defensible locations, surveillance, isolation and separation, infiltration, fortification, and preemptive arrests. Each of these tactics is discussed in detail.

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This article examines the policing of protest, focusing directly on how the state (through various law enforcement agencies) uses space to control and pacify social movements. The research focuses specifically on the anti-corporate globalization movement, drawing from five protest events. While there is ample academic work dealing with globalization and the movement that opposes it (see e.g., Appadurai 2001; Bauman 1998; Beck 2000; McBride & Wiseman 2000; Brecher, Costello & Smith 2000; Held & McGrew 2000; Starr 2000), there are relatively few works that examine the mechanisms that the state uses to control dissent at large anti-globalization gatherings (see e.g., Ericson & Doyle 1999; Gillham & Marx 2000). This study outlines the ways that mass protest is managed and controlled through the manipulation of space.

The current research resulted from two years of participatory observation within the anti-corporate globalization movement. Over a two-year period, data was collected on five large global protests, including: the World Economic Forum in New York City (February 2002), the Group of 8 (G8) in Calgary and Ottawa, Canada (July 2002), the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in Washington, DC (September 2002), the World Trade Organization in Cancun, Mexico (September 2003), and the Free Trade Area of the Americas in Miami (November 2003). Data was gathered through multiple ethnographic methods, including participatory observations, semi-structured interviews with law enforcement and anti-globalization activists,¹ and a review of police after action reports. By relating the analysis of the data to current discussions on protest policing, it is hoped that this article will expand our knowledge and point scholarly attention to the spatial dimensions of the social control of dissent.

POLICING PROTEST

In the last ten years, scholars have been increasingly interested in the policing of protests and the effects it has on social movements (McCarthy & McPhail 1997; della Porta & Reiter 1998; Waddington 1999; Schweingruber

2000). In that time, scholars have paid careful attention to the relationship between repression and social movement mobilization (Davenport, Johnston et al. 2004). For example, some scholars have found that activists shift from violent to non-violent activity when confronted with violent repression (Lichbach 1987), and that the type of state regime will predict the form of repression and how movements respond to that form of repression (Rasler 1996). Other scholars have identified different types of repression across various types of democratic institutions (della Porta & Reiter 1998). Some scholars argue that the role of the media is a central factor of mobilization regardless of the form of repression (Wisler & Giugni 1999), while others conclude that repression is likely to vary across police jurisdiction (McPhail & McCarthy 2004). What these studies have in common is that they focus primarily on understanding the causal relationship between repression and mobilization. In effect, it may be argued that they seek to explain how state repression affects social movements grow, action, or disintegration.

This study builds on the current research trend. However, rather than seeking to explain the causal relationship between repression and mobilization, this study provides a shift toward an analysis of *how* social control operates. To this end, there is an intentional digression from the concept of repression and an adoption of the term *social control of dissent*. It is argued that, as currently understood, the concept of repression is too narrowly constructed and leaves out multiple spheres of contention and domination. The term *social control of dissent*, on the other hand, opens up the theoretical possibilities for broader studies of protest control.

In this article, it is argued that social movement scholars have, for the most part, failed to fully analyze the role of space in the policing of protest. At least in part, the lack of analysis stems from the current focus on repression and mobilization. Thus, one advantage of framing the study of protest policing as the examination of the *social control of dissent* is that it allows scholars to analyze other techniques of control that are more subtle. In order to aid in this analysis, several police techniques used to control dissent are described below. Interestingly, analysis of these techniques indicate that the majority of them do not involve direct confrontation with protesters but, rather, concentrate on the manipulation of space and geography starting before the protesters are in the streets.

Selecting Defensible Locations

The control of space at an international protest begins with the selection of the geographical location for the summit or ministerial meeting. Shortly after the World Trade Organization (WTO) protest in Seattle, the state

learned an important lesson; they realized that the meeting location was an important aspect of dealing with potential protester disruption, since Seattle was a hub for several radical movements. Feeling pressured by the movement, institutions such as the WTO, World Economic Forum (WEF), and Group of 8 (G8) selected difficult-to-access geographical locations for their meetings. These locations, in turn, also made mass mobilization more costly and difficult.

Rather than selecting cities or regions with vibrant social movements (such as Seattle or other cities in the Pacific Northwest), they now choose meeting locations that are easily defensible by police and military, areas not readily accessible to protesters, and places with little or no local movement history. For example, two years after the 1999 WTO meeting in Seattle, the WTO held its meeting in Qatar in December 2001. Located in the Middle East, on a peninsula bordering the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia, Qatar is a Muslim state ruled by a monarchical family dating back to the mid-1800s (US Central Intelligence Agency, 2004). The government does not allow political demonstrations and severely limits freedom of association. In addition, due to strict immigration laws, it was almost impossible for protest organizers to enter Qatar prior to the meeting to do the groundwork necessary to launch a successful protest. In effect, the WTO, with the help of the Qatar government, stopped all protest at their 2001 ministerial meeting. However, selecting such an authoritarian government as the location for the meetings resulted in numerous critiques of the organization, lending support to the argument that the WTO was an authoritarian institution that did not care about human rights.

The selection of Cancun, Mexico, for the 2003 WTO ministerial meeting followed a similar pattern. Like Qatar, Cancun, it may be argued, also provided a strategic location for discouraging protest. Cancun offers an easily defensible physical environment. Geographically, Cancun is a narrow strip of land approximately sixteen miles long and about one and a half mile wide, connected at each end to the mainland. Security included heavily fortified checkpoints at each of the two entrances, with national police asking for identification cards and searching all vehicles going in and out of the area.

There is little (if any) history of political organizing in Cancun, which, unlike Seattle, makes it an ideal location for a meeting. The lack of grassroots organizing in Cancun made mobilization difficult and less organized. When activists from across the world arrived in Cancun weeks prior to the protests, there were very few local contacts to help with the basic requirements for organization. Cancun is also a relatively expensive location for travel, forcing

many of the activists to stay outside of the vacation area and in a small town approximately nine miles from the ministerial meetings.

Canadian law enforcement used a slightly different version of this tactic during the G8 summit meetings of 2002. According to an interview with an officer from the National Security Investigative Service within the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the selection process of the G8 meeting was based on the use of geographic structure to aid in security concerns:

At first, it was expected that the [2002] G8 meeting would be held in Ottawa. When it became apparent that [the 2001 G8 meeting in] Genoa was a violent situation, the venue was moved from Ottawa to a more isolated geographical location in the Rockies, in the beautiful area of Alberta. This was done primarily for security reasons, since this was a much more defensible location.

Thus, after facing a tumultuous group of protesters in Genoa, Italy, in 2001, the G8 selected a meeting location at an exclusive resort high in the Canadian woods. The resort was located in Kananaskis Village, Alberta. To further ensure isolation,

a security area with a radius of 6-1/2 kilometers, about 4 miles, [was] established around Kananaskis Village. Camping and recreational facilities within this area will be closed to the public ... and north-south travel along Alberta Highway 40 will be sharply restricted. In addition, a no-fly zone is being established with a radius of 80 nautical miles around Kananaskis (States News Service, 2002).

As a result, protesters were not able to get within viewing distance of the world leaders meeting in Canada. Instead, activists had to settle for protesting in Calgary, some 70 miles from Kananaskis Village. The G8 in Canada is an extreme case of the physical control of the environment around a meeting, where protesters have little chance of showing their dissatisfaction to world leaders. Like Cancun, these protesters were geographically removed from the location of the meetings.

A similar tactic was employed in June 2004 at the G8 summit in Georgia. Leaders of the eight most developed nations gathered at a resort on Sea Island, located 60 miles south of Savannah, Georgia. The location was selected for its seclusion, allowing for very tight security. No protesters were allowed on the island, and even journalists were based in Savannah.

In short, the spatial control of protest begins with selection of the geographical location for the summit or

ministerial meeting. Currently, there is an increasing trend toward selecting sites that make mobilization more difficult, locating the meetings in places that are hard to access, easy to isolate, and that have little local help for the movement. Taken together, these tactics set the stage for facilitating the control of space and for decreasing the mobilization and potential force of the movement.

Patrolling

According to observations, it appears that a more intense phase of spatial control starts approximately one week prior to the protest when police begin patrolling the general protest areas. In the weeks leading to a mass global protest, large numbers of activists arrive in town from various parts of the world. Police begin intensive patrols to coincide with increasing number of protesters in their city. The result of these activities appears to lead to a perception of intensive scrutiny on the part of protesters. According to one activist and organizer interviewed, the message is clear, "we [i.e., the police] are here and we are watching you." The activist went on to describe his perception of the patrols in greater detail,

Then when people start to arrive in town, you begin to see more and more police in the streets. They start to escalate contact. If there is a convergence space, then you see more patrols in that area. You see police cars parked outside activists' meeting places. You see vans taking pictures as you go in and out.

In the week leading up to the protest, then, police engage activists more directly. They begin a more obvious form of surveillance, placing marked cars and officers near convergence centers. They also patrol more intensely, issue tickets, and sometimes arrest and question activists. While the intensity of this tactic varies from city to city depending on the attitude of a given police department, police increase patrol and surveillance to reduce protesters' anonymity in their organizing space. Thus, the spaces that protesters use to organize and disseminate information are changed into spaces of surveillance, locations where peaceful gatherings become suspect.

Reducing Anonymous Space

Anonymity refers to the feeling of not being observed by the police. Reducing the anonymity of protesters while demonstrating or marching in the streets is a central strategy in the policing of space. Police reduce the feeling of anonymity in several ways, including patrolling, videotaping, and detaining protesters. It may be argued that these tactics are a form of disciplinary power, aimed at fixing the disciplinary gaze on protesters. As Foucault

(1979) notes, the aim of this power gaze is to place the burden of discipline on the observed, thus interiorizing the power of observation to the point where an activists becomes his own observer, each person regulating his or her own behavior. The observing gaze, coupled with an intense physical presence, may be employed as a technique to decrease mobilization among the more radical section of the group.

Police officers who plan for protest are well aware of the power of the disciplinary gaze. Well versed in the tactics of the anti-corporate globalization movement, a lieutenant with the DC Metropolitan Police Department and teacher of a course on mob behavior explains what he does while policing the movement. He states, "we try very much to prevent the feeling of anonymity. A person that feels anonymous in a march or protest is the person that is more likely to do a violent action and improper conduct. So we try to make sure we prevent that anonymous feeling."

Reducing anonymity for policing dates back at least to the late 18th Century. According to Foucault (1979), the thrust of modern power lies in the idea that reducing anonymity will lead individuals to self regulate their own behavior. For example, it has been suggested that in the case of the Panopticon, inmates in a prison will internalize the constant gaze of the guards leading them to self-police, making control much easier.

This impulse away from anonymity is ever present in contemporary society, from community policing tactics to national security investigations. For example, the seemingly innocuous Neighborhood Watch programs involve the vigilance of neighborhood residents to reduce the anonymity of any "outsider" entering the neighborhood. The use of this tactic against activists in the anti-globalization movement, then, is no different. What is interesting however, is not that police reduce anonymity in crowds, but the ways that they go about doing so.

A commander with the New York Police Department describes the use of anonymity reducing tactics in that city. He states:

We have been doing this since the Sixties here. We set up check points around the perimeter so that people know they are being frisked and will not bring anything to the demonstration that could cause injury. It's all about letting them know we are watching them. Then they will behave themselves.

A lieutenant from Washington, DC, notes a slightly different tactic, "cameras are one way to reduce anonymity. I am not telling all the different types of

cameras we use, but we do use them." One way they use cameras during a protest is by placing uniformed officers with camcorder in highly visible locations.

Creating a feeling of observation does not require high tech equipment. The lieutenant from DC describes a more rudimentary method:

We put police officer on top of trucks with a pen and paper, visible to the crowd. Those folks that see this officer are less likely to get involved in anything illegal if they know the police officer can identify them; hence the masks that the anarchist wear. This is to prevent them from feeling anonymous; so they understand they are being watched.

In Miami, the police surrounded the FTAA meeting location with a steel fence. Behind the fence, the police placed several cherry pickers, which made for elevated gun towers where they placed armed police officers standing vigilantly. The idea is simple, if the activists see the armed officers, then they will be less likely to act out, violently or otherwise. As a result, the space around protesters becomes "surveillance space," locations where actions are likely being monitored by police.

Reducing anonymity by making the gaze of the police obvious is a common practice in the policing of the anti-corporate globalization movement. Activists in the movement, aware of the tactic, take precautions against the police gaze and rebel against it at the same time. The most obvious response is the wearing of masks, including gas masks, bandanas, and scarves.

Wearing masks during a protest is one technique in a repertoire of contention that serves several functions. One is to protect activists from tear gas, should police choose to use it. Another is to produce a feeling of unity among masked individuals, creating a sense of solidarity. Yet, at a more abstract level, it is also a rebellious act against state surveillance, a symbolic act of being clandestine. The Italian group Ya Basta!, for example, uses this approach to describe the power of the state in erasing the rights of individuals who enter a country without proper government documentation (Notes from Nowhere 2003). In solidarity with all those "illegal" immigrants, the group wears masks as a form of symbolic protest, a stand with all clandestine individuals who must remain hidden. It may be argued that this approach becomes a mode of resistance; and it is this very act of being clandestine that police seek to minimize through a variety of tactics - including reviving laws that the wearing of a mask in public illegal, as was the case during the 2001 World Economic Summit in New York City.

Fortifying Space

In some respects, one might argue that the space surrounding the WTO, G8 and IMF meetings strongly resemble a war zone, with police in armored vehicles dressed in military style uniforms and carrying weapons designed for crowd control. This “militarization” is particularly prominent around buildings that house the global meeting, since this is the point of contact between police and protesters.

Although this “fortification approach” is rapidly becoming a common technique for crowd control, it has not always been the norm. In the 1999 protest in Seattle, for example, protesters shut down the WTO meetings by blocking key intersections, as well as blocking the entrances to buildings housing the delegates and the meetings. WTO delegates were unable to get out of their hotels and prevented from getting into the meetings. This came as a shock to the Seattle Police, who were not expecting such a decentralized, yet organized and well-timed action. In the years following the Seattle protest, the police studied the event and developed tactics to minimize this kind of action at future ministerial meetings.

Soon after the protest in Seattle, the Rand Corporation, with the help of the U.S. Department of Defense, conducted a study analyzing the situation in Seattle (Armond 2001). The report detailed several findings relevant to the current discussion. Among other things, the Report stated that, “the central fact of the Seattle protests is the utter surprise and confusion during the initial confrontation” (Armond 2001, p. 202). The police in Seattle were overwhelmed, unable to keep the protesters from shutting down the WTO ministerial meetings and taking over the streets in three days of battle. The cause of this situation, according to the Report, can be attributed to several factors. First, there was no unified police command until well into the protest, making communication difficult across law enforcement agencies. Second, there were not enough on-duty police officers to secure the city. And third, the police in Seattle were unprepared to deal with the decentralized, nonhierarchical, and net-based organizational structure of the movement.

At subsequent protests, police appear to have corrected each of these elements. None of the protests observed during this study lacked a unified police command structure. In fact, it appears that police now begin their preparations by identifying all law enforcement players, establishing a coordinating team, and building a clear command structure to prevent confusion during the protests. For example, in their *After Action Report*, the Miami Police describe the command structure for the FTAA protest, which involved over 40 law enforcement agencies.

In the initial planning phase, a single police Captain filled the roles of Incident Commander and Operations and Planning Section Commander. The command structure continually expanded as required to meet the increasing demands. The final command configuration included the Miami Police Department’s Deputy Chief as the Incident Commander, a Police Major as the Deputy Incident Commander, Police Commanders as the Commanders of Intelligence and the Hard Perimeter, and Captains in command of the Operations, Planning, and Finance Section with a lieutenant in charge of the Logistics Section (City of Miami Police Department, 2004).

It appears that these command structures now minimize communication problems between agencies during a protest, making it easier to coordinate policing efforts across law enforcement agencies.

In addition to the above, police departments also appear to have corrected the problem of having too few officers on-duty. For example, during the first day of protests in Seattle, police assigned 400 officers to the WTO demonstration (Armond, 2001). In sharp contrast, Miami had over 3,000 officers (including some from other cities) working at the demonstration (Nesmith, 2004).

Building Fences

Since Seattle, police have learned to control a decentralized, nonhierarchical, and net-based organizational structure of the movement. Learning from the Seattle case, police now strengthen security around the meeting location. To prevent another *Battle in Seattle* with activists blocking key intersections and preventing delegates from entering the meetings, police adopted techniques to ensure control of the general space. To secure protest areas, police created a secure zone, using fences and police to keep protesters away.

Soon after the Seattle protest, police had to rethink how to secure the space around the meetings to make it more difficult for protesters to succeed in disrupting the proceedings. At first, a simple solution was to erect a fence surrounding the building. For the World Economic Forum protest in New York City, the police fortified the areas around the Waldorf Astoria, the location hosting the meetings. Police erected fences around the hotel, making it impossible to get closer than four blocks of the building. During the IMF/World Bank protest in 2002, police used a similar tactic, surrounding the World Bank headquarters with a heavily fortified fence. The same was true in Cancun during the WTO protest in Mexico, only more so.

Adapting to the fence tactics, activists began to use fences as symbols of globalization, equating them to the national borders keeping people from moving freely across the globe. Using the fence as a symbol of globalization came naturally. For example, in New York City activists were distributing a pamphlet that reproduced the words of the Zapatista's *Subcomandante Marcos*. It read:

In any place in the world, anytime, any man or woman rebels to the point of tearing off the clothes that resignation has woven for them and cynicism has dyed gray. Any man or woman, of whatever color, in whatever tongue, speaks and says to himself, to herself: Enough is enough! ¡Ya Basta! For struggling for a better world all of us are fenced in, threatened with death. The fence is reproduced globally.

Inspired by these words, some of the more radical sections of the anti-globalization movement began to focus on fences as their targets. Bringing them down became a symbol of victory, a direct confrontation of globalization. In Cancun, activists were observed tearing down a fence constructed to keep activists away from the convention center. Tearing down the fence, in this instance, was mostly a symbolic act, given that destruction of the fence would still leave protesters far from WTO meeting space. In Cancun, therefore, tearing down the fence was both the action and the message.

The fortification of space through fences, then, appears to be one way of securing the perimeter around a meeting. Another way to fortify space is to create "security" or "frozen" zones. Without using fences, police can also secure entire areas of cities, keeping close watch on everyone who enters the area. The FTAA protest in Miami is the clearest example of this tactic, where the entire area around the Intercontinental Hotel (where the delegates were staying) was divided into several security zones. Police built an inner and outer perimeter around the hotel. The first perimeter was immediately around the hotel using French barricades.² The second perimeter expanded considerably. In the third space the police created a "soft perimeter" that included almost the entire downtown area. The following excerpt from the Miami Police *After Action Report* describes the perimeters.

After reviewing the conference locations and analyzing the potential threats based on past incidents and the promises of similar actions in Miami, the area immediately surrounding the host locales was broken down into Perimeters or Security Zones ...

Construction of a fixed barrier system resulting in the sealing of the "Restricted Area" for the duration of the FTAA event commenced on Sunday afternoon, November 16th, with the removal of the barricades and the installation of the security fence. The security fence was rented at a total cost of nearly \$200,000. It has a patented design that was created specifically to address unruly crowds seeking to breach security barriers. It is constructed of interlocking steel panels with tight mesh to prevent protestors from gaining a handgrip for either climbing or pulling on the fence. The fence has a metal plate attached at the bottom that extends approximately three feet towards the crowd. In order to get close enough to touch the fence, a protestor must stand on the attached metal plate. This plate prevents demonstrators from pushing over the fence, as they would be forced to also lift their own weight as they stand on the plate.

With the installation of the security fence, the "Restricted Area" became a frozen zone with strict controls on access to the area until the end of the event. This Restricted Area had several access points, staffed on a 24-hour basis. All persons wishing to gain access into the Restricted Area were required to have FTAA credentials. In the event a person did not have credentials, positive identification and verification that such a person was authorized entry into the Restricted Area was determined via the Command Post. Law Enforcement officers were also required to present credentials to enter the Restricted Area.

The plan called for each hotel and business located within the restricted area to have designated access points to enter the area. Those designated access points were to be displayed on each individual's credentials. As discussed in the "Additional Issues" section this report, the credential process was the responsibility of a non-law enforcement governmental agency. The original plan was determined to be faulty, however, enormous efforts by the law enforcement team resulted in the development of a contingency plan that limited the inconvenience caused by the initial breakdown in the credentialing process ...

A "soft perimeter" was also established with boundaries from NW/NE 6 Street on the north, Biscayne Boulevard on the east, NW/SW 2nd Avenue on the west, and the Miami River on the

south. Although south of the Miami River, the Brickell Avenue Financial Corridor was also considered to be within the soft perimeter. The role of officers assigned to the soft perimeter was to monitor vehicle and pedestrian traffic entering the Downtown area and maintain open the roadways along the perimeter. Staffing of the soft perimeter would not commence until 6AM on Tuesday, November 18th. Vehicular and pedestrian traffic were free to travel within the soft perimeter, however an increased police presence was necessary due to the area's close proximity to FTAA locations, the existence of attractive or vulnerable targets and the need to keep traffic flowing through the busy downtown area (City of Miami Police Department 2004, p. 11-12).

Having learned from the Seattle experience, the police devised new strategies, such as the use of fences and security zones. While protesters reacted symbolically to these barriers, they were still effective containing the movement. Taken together, this fortification of space can be interpreted as a tactical response to a decentralized, nonhierarchical, and net-based organizational structure of the anti-globalization movement.

Contain, Isolate, and Separate

Foucault's analogy of social control as disease control is informative in understanding how police treat and think about policing protest. Examining the power mechanisms involved, Foucault argued that controlling the Black Plague (or any plague) requires strict portioning of space, careful surveillance, inspection and order (Foucault, 1979). The control of the plague required strict control and division of space and time so that the disease would not spread. It may be argued that a similar approach occurs around the policing of radicals in the street (i.e., contain, isolate, and separate activists). The basic idea is simple and logical; keep the activists contained in an area so that the disturbance does not spread like a disease; separate and isolate those individuals who are infected (i.e., activists); divide and control the space and time around the meetings.

Containment, then, refers to the way that police keep "trouble" from spreading beyond a predetermined boundary. Historically, police developed various ways to control and contain a crowd, such as using lines of police officers to push a group in the desired direction, or the use of officers on horses to clear a troublesome space. However, the groups in the anti-corporate globalization movement use tactics that are more

difficult to police using traditional methods. The decentralized, affinity group model, with activists striking out in multiple locations at once, requires that police adopt new tactics. Some of those include, as described above, building security zones and fortifying with fences. Besides building protected perimeters in order to contain, police also carefully divide the protest space into small sections for easy surveillance.

The function of each grid officer was to monitor the area for any radical group activities and to file an immediate report to the Operations Center by phone or radio while still maintaining their undercover role. Officers were required to maintain grid integrity to limit the opportunity for a surprise attack occurring in one area while a diversionary action was taking place in another. As an additional set of eyes looking for spontaneous direct actions, the FBI and the Miami Police Department were jointly tasked with providing several electronic video-monitoring devices throughout the venue, which provided "live" video feed to the Operations Centers (City of Miami Police Department 2004, p. 18).

This intelligence grid allows police to see potential "hot spots" and respond accordingly; thus minimizing the potential success of a decentralized protest action.

In addition to responding to decentralize affinity-based actions, police also have to contend with other forms of protest actions, such as "snake marches." Snake marches are the movement's response to demonstration permits; rather than applying for a permit that requires negotiation with police and a predetermined route, these marches "snake" around in and out of streets. To deal with these, police use separation. Separation refers to the physical separation and isolation of protesters from the larger public and can be accomplished in several ways. For example, the police may adopt a method of policing that engulfs the marchers and separates them. Specifically, the police surround the entire march and attempt to break the group into smaller units, thus separating them from each other as well. The protesters are not only contained, but also isolated. One protester interviewed describes the result of such an action,

In Miami, there was a march that left from the convergence center of mostly Black Block folks. Soon after it left, the police came in and surrounded them all, completely surrounded them. Then they took them wherever they wanted them to go. The group I was with took off before

they could get us. They wanted us to go to a certain route and we just basically took off. But all they have to do is put up police lines in certain places to determine where we could and could not go. In the end, it felt like there was little we could do.

Police may employ a similar tactic on permitted marches that include small radical contingents within them. As in the case of the snake march, police in these cases may surround entire marches, separating the marchers from the general public. For example, the police surrounded and isolated the large WEF protest march on February 2nd, 2002, in New York City. With an estimated number of 10,000 marchers, the police used the permit process to establish a route for the march. Knowing the route, the police used barricades, officers, bikes, and motorcycles to contain the march to a predetermine path, making it difficult for protesters to leave the march and equally difficult for passersby to join. This approach makes it difficult for activists to enter or leave the march once it started. The police ensured that marchers would remain on the established route.

At the end of this march, the New York Police used another common tactic that may be referred to as "corralling." Corralling refers to the confinement of people into relatively small, fenced off areas established by the police for control purposes. Knowing that the endpoint of the WEF protest march was the Waldorf Astoria, the New York City Police constructed a series of "pens" at the end of the march. When the marchers arrived at the designated end, the police were ready, corralling the marchers in groups of approximately 2000 people. During an interview, a lieutenant with the New York City Police talked about how police use these pens.

We had a system of barricaded streets that we built. This is a system where we put people in pens, metal barricades. We make these large boxed-in areas where we know people are going to end up. We design breaks so that not everyone is in the same place. We try to make them substantial size, but small enough to break the groups down into manageable sections so that we can get into them in case people need help, if they are injured, or if they are doing something wrong. So, we have access to them in the pen so that we can do any type of police action. We do this systematic enough so that we can control the crowd. We build one, fill it with people, section it off, and then we build another, section it off, and so on until the entire crowd is contained in neat boxes.

CONCLUSION

The control of space is central in the social control of dissent and the policing of protest. After the 1999 WTO protests in Seattle, police developed and adopted techniques designed to deal with a decentralized, non-hierarchical, network-based movement. This type of policing required thoughtful planning and careful attention to the geographical space in order to control mass movements. Law enforcement adopted specific maneuvers and tactics designed to manipulate the space before and during a large mobilizations of the anti-corporate globalization movement. Up to now, these control techniques have been mostly unnoticed by social movement scholars. If we want to understand the spatial dimensions of control, however, we must look beyond notions of repression as it occurs during a protest and examine the various ways that police manipulate space to ensure strategic advantages.

ENDNOTES

¹ All the names that appear in this article have been changed to preserve the anonymity of those interviewed.

² French barricades are what an officer called them during an interview.

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